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Abstract
A recent stream of experimental economics literature studies the factors that
contribute to the emergence of financial bubbles. We consider a setting where par-
ticipants sorted according to their degree of risk aversion trade in experimental asset
markets. We show that risk sorting is able to explain bubbles partially: Markets
with the most risk-tolerant traders exhibit larger bubbles than markets with the
most risk averse traders. In our study risk aversion does not correlate with gen-
der or cognitive abilities, so it is an additional factor that helps understand bubbles.
Keywords: experiment, risk sorting, asset bubble
JEL-codes: C91, G12
Our economic history is a series of tragic collapses intermitting periods of growth.
Perhaps the most spectacular elements of the crises are the asset bubbles: non-sustainable
increases of asset prices that inevitably end in a crash. In the last decades experimental
economics has proven to be a valuable tool in understanding why and how bubbles form.
The experimental asset market literature studied — among other questions — how traits
of the traders, expectations and features of the market mechanism affected the emergence
of bubbles (Palan, 2013; Powell and Shestakova, 2016).
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Several recent experimental studies indicate that the sorting of participants may af-
fect the formation of bubbles. The gender composition may influence the emergence
of bubbles, as shown by Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn (2015) and Cueva and Rustichini (2015).
Bosch-Rosa et al. (2018) report that on markets composed of subjects with better cog-
nitive abilities, no bubbles arise. Janssen et al. (2018) show that when sorting traders
according to their speculative tendencies, markets with more speculative traders lead to
larger bubbles.
We propose a new sorting that may explain the formation of bubbles and is both i)
theoretically intuitive, ii) observable in real life, and iii) able to partially organize previous
results. The basis of our sorting is risk tolerance, which according to our hypothesis is an
important factor in the emergence of bubbles. The asset that is traded in the experimental
markets is inherently risky, as it yields a stochastic dividend. By definition, more risk-
tolerant traders value such an asset more in terms of utility. At the individual level, this
higher valuation may translate into a willingness to pay a higher price for the asset and
to sell the asset only at a higher price. If a market is populated with more risk-tolerant
traders, then the market price that clears the market may be higher than in markets with
more risk averse traders. Hence, we expect that sorting according to risk aversion is a
potential source of bubbles.
Let us turn to the issue of whether such sorting goes on in real life. We consider first
sorting according to the factors investigated by the literature. While there is a considerable
imbalance in the gender composition in asset markets (Green et al. 2009 present such
statistics), the clear (all-male vs. all-female) sorting assumed by Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn
(2015) is hard to imagine. Moreover, Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn (2017) find that the difference
vanishes when the gender composition is hidden from the participants. Real asset markets
with sorting according to cognitive skills or speculative tendencies are even harder to
imagine, and the studies that propose such kinds of sorting do not provide examples.
Risk sorting, however, is a phenomenon that occurs naturally in asset markets, in at least
two dimensions.
On the one hand, banks often draw up a risk profile of their customers wishing to
trade on the stock market and try to dissuade those who are risk averse. They do this not
only to protect the client but to comply with various international legal requirements. For
instance, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in the EU prescribes
the following guideline:
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”When providing investment advice or portfolio management the investment
firm shall obtain the necessary information regarding the client’s or potential
client’s knowledge and experience in the investment field relevant to the spe-
cific type of product or service, that person’s financial situation including his
ability to bear losses, and his investment objectives including his risk tolerance
so as to enable the investment firm to recommend to the client or potential
client the investment services and financial instruments that are suitable for
him and, in particular, are in accordance with his risk tolerance and ability to
bear losses.” (Article 25/2 of European Parliament (2014))1
Such regulation implies that only sufficiently risk-tolerant retail investors are likely to
be active in risky asset markets, so there is some risk sorting going on for retail investors.
On the other hand, there is some evidence that risk aversion also affects career choice
in finance. Sapienza et al. (2009) find that MBA students with low risk aversion are more
likely to pursue a risky finance career after graduation. This suggests that professionals
in finance may have lower risk aversion than the average population, a sign of risk sorting.
More generally, there is extensive evidence that self-selection into more risky activities
occurs. Fossen (2012) presents ample empirical testimony that less risk averse individuals
self-select into entrepreneurship (see Table 3.6 in Fossen 2012 for an overview). More-
over, Lazear and Shaw (2007) claim that firms choose compensation structures for their
employees in a way to attract the individuals with the desired skills, hence, fostering
self-selection.
Interestingly, risk tolerance may be an organizing principle behind some of the previous
results. Sex and cognitive abilities often relate to each other. Males generally perform
better in cognitive tasks (Frederick, 2005). Hence, according to Bosch-Rosa et al. (2018),
males could be expected to generate fewer and smaller bubbles, contrary to the findings
of Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn (2015). A possible way out of this conundrum is the association
of these factors with risk aversion. It is well-established that, in general, females are more
risk averse than males (e.g. Croson and Gneezy 2009, Eckel and Grossman 2008)2, and
many studies find that cognitive abilities are negatively related to risk aversion (see, for
instance, Burks et al. 2009, Dohmen et al. 2010, Benjamin et al. 2013, or Dohmen et al.
1Similar regulations are in place elsewhere, see for instance the Australian Financial Services Reform
Act. The EU has similar rule for insurance and reinsurance product distribution, see Article 30/1 of
(European Parliament, 2016).
2We note that Filippin and Crosetto (2016) question the ubiquity of this finding.
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2018)3. Therefore, risk aversion is a potential factor that helps understand the mechanism
behind the effect of gender and cognitive abilities. In fact, both Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn
(2015) and Bosch-Rosa et al. (2018) point out the importance of risk aversion, without
explicitly assessing its effects.
Based on the previous considerations, we formulate two hypotheses. First, the risk
tolerance of traders may affect the formation of bubbles. More precisely, we expect to see
larger bubbles in markets populated by more risk-tolerant traders. Second, we hypothesize
that the mechanism behind the previous conjecture is that more risk-tolerant traders are
willing to i) pay higher prices for the experimental asset and ii) sell the experimental asset
at a higher price. To test these hypotheses, we invited 96 participants to an experiment.
In the first phase of the experiment, we let them play experimental games that measured
their risk and uncertainty attitudes and cognitive abilities. Then, without making them
aware of the fact, we sorted them into 12 experimental asset markets according to their
risk tolerance; they traded on these markets in two rounds, each consisting of 15 periods.
We focus on bubbles, that is, on the positive deviation from the fundamental value of the
experimental asset.
Related to our first hypothesis, we find a significant difference between the markets
populated by the most and least risk-tolerant traders, the bubbles being significantly
larger in the first case. To see if our second conjecture holds, we use panel regressions
to investigate how individual and market characteristics affect if buy/sell orders exceed
the fundamental value. We find that more risk-tolerant individuals tend to submit more
excessive buy orders, supporting the above mechanism. However, we do not find the same
effect for sell orders. Reassuringly, throughout the analysis we document that cognitive
abilities and gender play an important role in the formation of bubbles, in line with
the existing literature. Looking at round 2, we observe that — again in line with the
literature — bubbles decrease or disappear. However, it does not happen uniformly, as in
the markets with the most risk-tolerant traders, we still observe bubbles, while in other
markets they disappear.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we review the existing literature, and then,
in section 2 we present the experimental design and state our basic hypotheses. Section
3 contains the results, and section 4 concludes.
3It should be noted that the literature is not unambiguous. Andersson et al. (2016) claim that there
is no such relationship.
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1 Related literature
Here we briefly review the literature that is most related to our study. First, we present
the results that show some effect of sorting along different dimensions on the formation
and size of bubbles. Then, we summarize the findings on the role of risk attitudes in
experimental asset markets.
Sorting occurs if traders are (more likely) selected along some features into the exper-
imental asset market. Perhaps the most studied sorting is that according to experience.
In their classic study Smith et al. (1988) find that the more experienced traders there
are in the experimental market, the fewer/smaller bubbles form. Similar findings appear
in Dufwenberg et al. (2005); King (1991); King et al. (1993); Lei and Vesely (2009), and
van Boening et al. (1993)4. Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn (2015) are the first to study whether
sorting based on gender has any effect on experimental asset markets. They use the
canonical experimental asset market design from Smith et al. (1988), but their markets
consist of all male or all female traders, which can be easily observed by the participants.
Based on the gender differences in risk taking, they conjecture that all-male markets
lead to larger bubbles than all-female markets. They provide convincing support for this
hypothesis. Moreover, in a follow-up experiment and after analyzing many other stud-
ies, they find that the share of female traders in markets is negatively correlated with
mispricing. Cueva and Rustichini (2015) also investigate how gender composition affects
trading in experimental asset markets. Contrary to Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn (2015), they find
that there is no significant difference between all-male and all-female markets in terms of
volatility and bubbles, but mixed-gender markets exhibit small deviations from the funda-
mental value, even after taking into account risk aversion and cognitive skills. Holt et al.
(2017) find that when the fundamental value of the experimental asset is flat, then bubbles
are ubiquitous and of similar magnitude for both genders, but they report larger bubbles
for male-only groups when the fundamental value has a declining pattern. Wang et al.
(2017) report that all-female markets in China generate comparable experimental bubbles
to those produced by all-male markets. They also document gender difference when com-
paring similar markets in the US, hinting at the possibility that gender-related findings
in financial markets may be sensitive to culture.
Bosch-Rosa et al. (2018) carry out a similar exercise, but they sort participants accord-
4There are some papers that find no mitigating effect of experience: e.g. Noussair and Powell (2010),
Oechssler et al. (2011).
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ing to cognitive sophistication into markets. In the first part of their experiment, subjects
play 4 games that allow them to construct an index of cognitive sophistication. Then,
they classify the upper/lower 30 percent according to this index as having high/low cogni-
tive sophistication and invite the participants to partake in an experimental asset market.
They find that markets populated by subjects with low cognitive abilities exhibited the
well-known bubble and crash patterns. However, no bubbles or crashes were observed
on the markets with highly sophisticated participants. The authors also measured risk
aversion that showed no significant correlation with cognitive abilities. This suggests
that their result is not driven by correlation between cognitive abilities and risk aversion.
Interestingly, Bosch-Rosa et al. (2018) find that average session risk aversion is signifi-
cantly and negatively correlated with some bubble measures, hinting at the possibility
that higher average risk aversion may lead to fewer/smaller bubbles. Hanaki et al. (2017)
investigate if and how diversity in cognitive abilities affects mispricing in experimental
asset markets. They find that heterogeneity in cognitive abilities leads to significantly
larger mispricing than homogeneity (regardless of individuals’ with low or high cognitive
ability forming the market).
Regarding the effect of cognitive skills, Cueva and Rustichini (2015) and Breaban and Noussair
(2015) report similar findings to Bosch-Rosa et al. (2018): An increase in the average
cognitive skills is associated with a significant decrease of mispricing. In a recent paper
Janssen et al. (2018) investigate if sorting according to speculative tendencies may lead
to overpricing in experimental asset markets. They find higher overpricing in markets
with traders who are more speculative according to a speculation elicitation task. In a
similar way, Kocher et al. (2018) sort participants according to self-control and find that
reduced self-control leads to market overpricing.
Turning to the effect of risk aversion: Early papers in the experimental asset mar-
ket literature already point out the role of risk attitudes. Several authors (King et al.,
1993; Porter and Smith, 1995; Miller, 2002; Porter and Smith, 2008) hypothesize that risk
aversion causes prices to start out low and as subjects get acquainted with the trading
mechanism, they become less risk averse, which in turn leads to increases in price and
potential emergence of bubbles. More concretely, if risk averse subjects sell their as-
sets early and then only participants with higher risk appetite trade, then prices may
appreciate, leading to a bubble. Fellner and Maciejovsky (2007) analyze data of four
published papers (El-Sehity et al., 2002; Kirchler and Maciejovsky, 2002; Kirchler et al.,
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2005; Maciejovsky et al., 2007) to see if risk attitudes measured through binary lottery
choices are systematically associated with market behavior. They find that the more
risk averse a participant is, the less active she is in the market. They also report
marked gender differences (women being more risk averse). One may conjecture that
less trading activity mitigates the possibility of bubbles and in this sense risk aversion
may lead to fewer/smaller bubbles. However, based on the data the authors cannot make
such strong statements, while our study allows us to see if such a hypothesis is true.
Breaban and Noussair (2015) find that the average risk aversion of participants correlates
negatively with the price level, hence, leading to less mispricing. Risk aversion also affects
trading behavior, as more risk averse subjects are more likely to sell assets and trade more
on the fundamental value. However, Cueva and Rustichini (2015) find that risk aversion
is not a good predictor of bubble measures. In all these studies there is no risk sort-
ing, so no conclusion can be drawn on the effect of such (self-)selection. The only study
we are aware of that investigates bubbles is a chapter in Dirk-Jan Janssen’s PhD thesis
(Janssen, 2017). They use the bomb risk elicitation task (Crosetto and Filippin, 2013)
to form call markets according to risk tolerance. There are low/moderate and high risk
averse markets. Contrary to us, they report no convincing relationship between individual
and market average risk aversion and aggregate market outcomes. There are important
differences between their and our design: (i) traders in their market start with the same
endowment and (ii) endowments are reinstated after each period. It has yet to be seen if
these differences explain the discrepancies between their and our results.
2 Experimental design
In May 2017 we invited 96 students with a wide range of majors (less than 10% with
economics or business studies) to the Corvinus University of Budapest (Hungary) to
a unique session. In the first part of the experiment, we elicited, in an incentivized
way, their risk/uncertainty attitude and cognitive abilities, while in the second part of
the experiment, they were sorted according to their risk tolerance and participated in
experimental asset markets.
Mainly two trading institutions are used in the asset market literature: (continuous)
double auction markets and call markets. We used the call market because due to the
elicitation phase, the experiment was lengthy and call markets were easier to implement
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given the time constraint we had. Two recent surveys, Palan (2013) (see Observation 27)
and Powell and Shestakova (2016) (see section 2.2.), show that there is no qualitative
difference between the two institutions regarding outcomes. Contrary to some other
studies that analyze call markets (e.g. Bosch-Rosa et al. 2018, Haruvy et al. 2007), we do
not elicit price forecast. Hanaki et al. (2018b) find that if price forecasts are elicited and
subjects are paid based on both forecasting and trading, then mispricing is enhanced.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experimental software z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and for the asset market we used a modified version of GIMS
(Palan, 2015). In the experimental asset market, we implemented 12 independent call
markets, each with 8 traders trading 16 assets. The experiment lasted about 2 hours and
consisted of two parts.
2.1 Eliciting Individual Characteristics
In the first part of the experiment, upon arrival participants were seated randomly at a
computer in one of the four rooms used in the experiment. Once all the subjects were
ready, the instructions for the first part were read aloud and questions were answered
privately. Subjects were informed that the experiment would consist of two parts. More-
over, they learnt from the experimenter that from the tasks of the first part one would be
randomly chosen and paid at the end of the experiment. The main objective of the first
part of the experiment was to evaluate several individual characteristics of the subjects.
In particular, we were interested in the (i) risk attitude, (ii) decisions in situations with
strategic uncertainty, (iii) cognitive abilities, and (iv) choices under uncertainty. Hence,
subjects started with completing a version of the Ellsberg two-color choice task. In this
task there is a bag containing 10 black and 10 red balls. Participants are endowed with
1489 Tokens and choose one of the colors and the amount to bet on the chosen color.
We used 1489 Tokens as endowment because it is not a round number in the sense that
it does not end in zero(s), so it is not so easy to make focal decisions (e.g. risking half
of the endowment). If the subject correctly guesses the color of the ball, which is ran-
domly selected by the computer, she earns 2.5 times her bet, and otherwise, the money
is lost. The amount of the bet is a natural measure of risk aversion: the less a partic-
ipant bets, the more risk-averse she is. Afterwards the subjects played the Stag Hunt
game with a randomly chosen partner. With this game we attempted to capture their
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attitudes to strategic uncertainty that may affect behavior in asset markets as well (see
Akiyama et al. 2017 or Hanaki et al. 2018a). Next followed the Cognitive Reflection Test
(Frederick, 2005) to assess subjects’ cognitive abilities. At the end, in order to evaluate
the attitude of subjects regarding uncertainty, they played a modified version of the first
task: where the distribution of the two colors was unknown. The translation of all four
tasks can be found in full detail in Appendix A.
At the end of the first part of the experiment, subjects were informed about their
performance in all four tasks (in Tokens) and about the randomly chosen task for which
they would receive payment at the end of the experiment. To sort participants into
experimental asset markets we used the risk attitude measure. In Table 1 we show the
characteristics of the markets based on the tasks in phase 1 of the experiment.
Table 1: Attitudes and abilities
M
ar
ke
t Risk Uncertainty Strategic Cognitive
F
em
al
e
attitude attitude uncertainty abilities
Average SD Average SD (chose A) Average SD
1 1433.25 103.837 873.625 629.376 75.0% 1.875 1.642 50.0%
2 1006.125 17.732 580.375 397.825 50.0% 0.875 0.835 25.0%
3 799.375 21.784 710 230.770 50.0% 1.125 1.246 75.0%
4 744.375 2.504 652.125 139.697 37.5% 2.125 1.126 62.5%
5 700 0.000 605.625 179.592 62.5% 1.625 1.685 75.0%
6 609.875 62.382 486.125 246.803 87.5% 1 1.309 25.0%
7 500 0.000 554.875 105.918 50.0% 1.625 1.061 50.0%
8 467.5 36.571 521.375 243.966 37.5% 2.375 1.061 0.0%
9 387.5 23.146 381.25 125.178 37.5% 1.125 0.835 87.5%
10 268.75 37.201 318.75 217.021 62.5% 2.5 0.926 50.0%
11 182.75 29.688 151.5 160.104 37.5% 1.625 1.408 37.5%
12 38.75 43.239 172.875 255.259 37.5% 2.125 1.458 50.0%
Note that in Market 1, which is composed of the most risk-tolerant participants,
traders placed as bet more than 95% of their endowment in the task that measured risk
attitudes. The corresponding number in Market 12, populated by the most risk averse
traders, is about 2.5%. This shows that the sorting into markets based on risk attitude
led to markets with substantially different average risk characteristics. However, also
note that differences between subsequent markets are not very sharp in some cases (e.g.
markets 4 and 5 or markets 7 and 8). This suggests that even if there is significant
difference between the markets with the most and the least risk-tolerant traders, there
may be no difference between subsequent markets.
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2.2 The Call Market
The second part of the experiment consisted of the implementation of 12 call markets
where the traders of a market could trade units of a risky asset (share) with other traders
of the market. We used the data on the risk attitude indicator from the first part of the
experiment to form 12 homogeneous asset markets by simply ranking subjects according to
this variable and sorting them into groups of 8. Therefore, in each market the participants
exhibited a similar risk attitude. Groups were formed anonymously: Subjects were not
informed either about the identity or any characteristic of the other traders in the market.
Instructions for the second part – containing the detailed description of the functioning
of the call markets – were read aloud, and all questions were answered. Subjects were
informed that they would trade with the same traders during the twice repeated 15 trading
periods, each lasting 90 seconds. It was also explained in the instructions that one of the
two 15-period market rounds would be randomly chosen for payment at the end of the
experiment. In order to ensure that subjects understand the task and get familiar with
the design of the market page, they first played a practice period. At the beginning of
the real market phase, traders were given a random amount of initial endowment, in a
combination of units of assets and cash. In line with the existing literature, we defined
three endowment types that were the same in all 12 markets and were distributed among
the traders of a group in the following way:
Asset (units) Cash (in tokens) Number of traders
1 4720 3
2 2920 2
3 1120 3
Subjects were told their own initial endowment and were informed that the other
participants might have different initial endowments, but all with the same expected
value.
In each trading period subjects could submit at most one buy order (i.e. quantity and
a maximum unit price to buy) and/or one sell order (i.e. quantity and a minimum unit
price to sell) with the only conditions being that (i) a trader’s submitted selling price
cannot be lower than her submitted buying price, and (ii) all submitted orders have to
be in line with the actual endowment of the subject (e.g. no short-selling is allowed).
10
Instructions stated clearly that submitting orders and trading is not compulsory (if, for
example, prices are not attractive enough). Each trading period lasted 90 seconds, and
orders could be submitted before the time expired. At the beginning of each trading
period, subjects were informed about the quantity of assets and cash at their disposal.
Once a trading period finished, the market price of the asset was determined by the
computer and the endowment of the subjects was updated with the realized transactions
of the period. Each asset held at the end of a trading period paid a stochastic dividend
of either 0, 40, 140, or 300 Tokens with the same probability (i.e. expected dividend:
120 Tokens; this expected value was stated clearly in the instructions and on the trading
screens). Subjects were informed at the end of each period about the market price of the
asset, the number of shares they sold and/or bought in the actual period, the dividend
achieved in the actual period, and the new (updated) amount of assets and cash at their
disposal for trading in the next period. The asset has a buy-back value of 0 Token at the
end of period 15, hence, the fundamental value (FV) of the asset at the end of period
t is simply 120(16 − t) Tokens. Once the first 15-period round was over, subjects were
informed about their gains, i.e. the total cash held at the end of period 15 (in Tokens).
Finally, the market game was repeated (without changing the composition of the markets)
once again, with the only difference being that the initial endowment of a subject could
be different, as it was again randomly drawn from the same distribution.
After both market rounds finished, subjects were informed about their total payoff
(in Tokens), which comprised the money won in the first part of the experiment (i.e.
payment of one randomly chosen task), the gains of the randomly chosen market round
(which turned out to be round 1), and the show-up fee of 3000 Tokens. Final payoffs were
displayed on the last screen both in Token and in Hungarian Forint (HUF), the exchange
rate being 3 Tokens = 1 HUF. Average payoff was about 3750 HUF (the equivalent of
about 12 EUR or 13.3 USD at that time).
2.3 Hypotheses
We formulate two broad hypotheses. The first concerns the relationship between risk
tolerance and the emergence of bubbles, and the second describes a potential mechanism
through which risk tolerance may affect the formation of bubbles.
Hypothesis 1 (Risk tolerance): Risk tolerance affects the formation of bubbles. We
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expect to see larger bubbles on markets populated with more risk-tolerant traders.
Hypothesis 1 simply states that we expect to see larger bubbles on markets with
traders exhibiting more risk tolerance. Note that we do not formulate exactly how the
relationship may be. We allow for a linear relationship, but potentially there is only
difference on the extremes (as in Bosch-Rosa et al. 2018).
Hypothesis 2 (Buy and sell orders): We conjecture that more risk-tolerant traders
value the asset traded on the experimental market more. Therefore, the more risk-tolerant
a trader is, the higher price she is willing to pay for the asset. More concretely, higher
risk tolerance may correlate with a higher positive deviation from the fundamental value.
Similarly, the more risk-tolerant the trader is, the higher price she requires to sell the
asset.
Hypothesis 2 specifies a potential channel through which hypothesis 1 may hold. The
experimental asset used in the experiment yields a stochastic dividend that is inherently
risky. By definition, the more risk-tolerant an individual is, the more she values such a
risky investment in terms of utility. As a consequence, she may be willing to pay a higher
price to obtain this asset than a more risk averse individual. Since we are interested in
the formation of bubbles, we conjecture that higher individual risk tolerance is associated
with higher buy order above the fundamental value. A similar story holds when selling the
experimental asset. At an individual level, a more risk-tolerant trader is willing to sell the
risky asset only at a higher price, so she submits a high sell order. Higher risk tolerance
may correlate with higher sell orders above the fundamental value. These individual
effects may aggregate on the market level. If there is a market with more risk-tolerant
individuals than another market, then we expect that the higher individual willingness to
both pay and sell at a higher price translates into a higher market price, ceteris paribus.
3 Results
In Table 2 we report the pairwise correlations between the individual characteristics of
the participants. Risk attitude and choices under uncertainty are highly and positively
correlated. Choice under uncertainty is weakly and negatively correlated with cognitive
abilities and positively correlated with strategic uncertainty. Female participants toler-
ated significantly more uncertainty in task 4 but performed significantly worse than male
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subjects in the Cognitive Reflection Test. Importantly, risk tolerance did not correlate
significantly either with cognitive abilities or with gender, so risk aversion cannot organize
the results found in previous literature.5
Table 2: Pairwise correlation between individual characteristics
Risk Uncertainty Cognitive Strategic
abilities uncertainty
Risk —
Uncertainty 0.5165*** —
Cognitive abilities −0.1104 −0.1869* —
Strategic uncertainty 0.1585 0.1731* 0.0319 —
Female 0.0042 0.2125** −0.2022** −0.0822
Next, in Figure 1 we show the evolution of the prices in phase 1. We group three
markets together and depict the average prices of these markets and how prices evolve
on them. Grouping three markets together is natural, as these groups were seated in the
same room and they also represent quartiles. To assess the extent of bubbles/mispricing,
we also plot the fundamental value.
Visual inspection suggests that in line with our conjecture bubbles in markets 1-3
(populated by the most risk-tolerant traders) are more pronounced than in other markets
(except markets 7 and 9). Markets 7 and 9 do not exhibit the generally observed crash
pattern.6
Measures that quantify the deviation from the fundamental value are generally known
as bubble or mispricing measures. We believe that a distinction is warranted. The idea
of bubble implies prices above the fundamental value, while mispricing encompasses any
deviation from the fundamental value. Hence, bubble measures, contrary to mispricing
measures, gauge only positive deviations from the fundamental value. Note that mispric-
ing measures take into account the negative deviations that occur always at the beginning
of the trading. However, these deviations are mainly due to the fact that in these ini-
tial periods subjects get acquainted with the trading mechanism. This learning process
may make the mispricing measures noisy, which is why we give a larger weight to bubble
5Bosch-Rosa et al. (2018) also fail to detect a significant relationship between risk aversion and cogni-
tive abilities. Horn and Kiss (2018) did not find significant association between gender and risk attitudes
in a different experiment carried out with university students in Hungary.
6While this seems somewhat strange, it has been already observed in the literature. For instance,
Smith et al. (1988) in their classic study find that professional and business people from the Tucson area
generate a large bubble and no crash. Some of the all-female markets in Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn (2015)
also do not exhibit a crash at the end of the trading. Moreover, Lei et al. (2001) set up an environment
in which speculation is impossible and even under such condition they document prices exceeding the
maximum possible future dividend earnings.
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Figure 1: Price evolution. (Top left pane: markets 1-3 populated by the most risk-tolerant
traders. Top right pane: markets 4-6, second most risk-tolerant set of markets. Bottom
left pane: markets 7-9, third most risk-tolerant quartile of markets. Bottom right pane:
markets 10-12 populated by the least risk-tolerant traders.)
measures.7 For the same reason, we also exclude the first 5 periods from part of the
analysis.
We consider three mispricing measures. Average Bias (
∑
t
(Pt−FVt)/15) averages the
deviation of period price from period fundamental value. A large Average Bias indicates
that prices tend to stay above fundamentals and, hence, signals bubbles, while an Average
Bias close to zero shows the lack of mispricing. Note that an Average Bias close to
zero may be due to the fact that negative deviations from the fundamental value at the
beginning of the trading offset large positive deviations that occur later. Total Dispersion
(
∑
t
|Pt − FVt|) sums the absolute deviation of period price from period fundamental value
and shows how close prices and fundamental values are to each other. The larger the value,
the larger the mispricing. Amplitude (maxt {(Pt − FVt)/FVt} −mint {(Pt − FVt)/FVt})
7Janssen et al. (2018) also focus on ”specific measures that describe fundamentally unjustified positive
price deviations.”
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measures the trough-to-peak change in market price relative to the fundamental value.
Large amplitude suggests large volatility that is potentially due to bubble.
We consider the following bubble measures. Positive Deviation is similar to Total
Dispersion, but it sums only the absolute per-period price deviations from the per-period
fundamental value if prices are above the fundamental value.8 The larger the positive
deviation, the larger the bubble. Boom Duration counts the maximum number of con-
secutive periods above the fundamental value. Longer boom duration is a sign of larger
bubbles. We define a new measure of our own that is very similar to Amplitude. We
call it Positive Amplitude, and it measures the maximum positive deviation from the
fundamental value.9
There is another measure that is widely considered in the literature but is not based on
deviation from the fundamental value. Turnover measures trading activity and is defined
as the sum of all transactions divided by the number of shares in the market. High turnover
implies high trading activity, which in turn is associated with mispricing/bubbles.
If we calculate the correlations between the previous measures (see Appendix C), then
we find that Positive Deviation is the most encompassing measure of bubbles/mispricing,
as it correlates at at least 5 percent significance level with 4 other measures. Total
Dispersion correlates very strongly with Positive Deviation and the amplitude measures
(that are also associated at 5 per cent). Boom Duration correlates with at 5 per cent only
with Average Bias, while Turnover is orthogonal to all other measures.
3.1 Risk tolerance and bubble/mispricing measures
Table 3 shows the value of the different bubble/mispricing measures. It also indicates
the value of the Mann-Whitney U test, which compares the markets with the most risk-
tolerant individuals (markets 1-3) with the markets formed by the most risk averse agents
(markets 10-12).
If we ignore markets 7-9 because we do not observe the crash pattern in two of these
three markets, then we find that the bubble/mispricing measures behave as expected: The
average of the bubble/misprising measures decreases as the risk-tolerance of the markets
8There are modifications of this measure that use some normalization. Haruvy et al. (2007) divide our
measure by the number of assets, while Bosch-Rosa et al. (2018) normalize with mean fundamental value
in the market. These modifications do not change any of the results, as they only scale our measure.
9There are many other measures in the literature (Sto¨ckl et al., 2010). Most of them are just trans-
formations of the ones used.
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decreases. More precisely, the average of these measures is higher for markets 1-3 than for
markets 4-6 or markets 10-12. Similarly, these averages for markets 4-6 are higher than
for markets 10-12. Hence, in these bilateral comparisons the directions are as expected
for all the measures.
Table 3: Observed values of bubble and mispricing measures. The last row shows the
p-value of the Mann-Whitney U test comparing markets 1-3 to 10-12.
Bubble measures Mispricing measures
Positive Boom Positive Average Total
Market Deviation Duration Amplitude Bias Dispersion Amplitude Turnover
1 1795 8 490 78.08 2575 790 1.31
2 2340 8 690 −60 5580 1790 2.13
3 4180 7 800 93.08 7150 1900 1.5
Avg 1-3 2771.67 7.67 660 37.05 5101.67 1493.33 1.65
4 110.5 2 80 −145.95 1680.5 420 1.31
5 2750 10 520 −2 5530 1720 1.5
6 960 5 160 −16.92 2140 960 1.94
Avg 4-6 1273.50 5.67 253.33 −54.96 3116.83 1033.33 1.58
7 7180 5 1430 324.62 10140 2310 1.75
8 620 10 130 32.31 820 330 2
9 6140 3 1540 306.00 9220 2640 1.13
Avg 7-9 4646.67 6 1033.33 220.97 6726.67 1760 1.63
10 1272 5 420 37.08 2099 1060 1.75
11 420 3 120 −120 2400 910 1.5
12 330 4 96 −196.1 2621 1397 1.44
Avg 10-12 674 4 212 −93.01 2373.33 1122.33 1.56
p-value 0.0495 0.0463 0.0495 0.1266 0.1266 0.5127 1
However, if we carry out the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U tests comparing mar-
kets 1-3, markets 4-6, and markets 10-12, then we only observe statistically significant
differences for the bubble measures between markets 1-3 and markets 10-12 (see the last
line in Figure 3). The differences between markets 1-3 and markets 4-6 or between mar-
kets 4-6 and markets 10-12 are not significant. Since we are interested in bubbles, we
carried out the same analysis but after excluding periods 1-5, as mentioned before. Note
that in these periods the market price is generally below the fundamental value, probably
because participants get used to the trading in these periods. In Table A1 in Appendix B
we reproduce Table 3 after excluding periods 1-5. Now, all bubble/mispricing measures
reveal a significant difference at the 5% significance level between markets 1-3 and markets
10-12. As before, we do not see a significant difference between markets 1-3 and markets
4-6 and between markets 4-6 and markets 10-12. Therefore, significant differences mate-
rialize only when comparing the extremes. For turnover, no significant difference can be
documented.
One may wonder whether these findings are robust to which markets we compare.
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What if we compare the first 4 or 5 markets to the last 4 or 5 markets? If we repeat
the same exercise but compare the upper 4/5 markets with the lower 4/5 markets (and
ignore markets 7 and 9, which do not show the crash pattern), then we do not observe
any significant differences in the bubble/mispricing measures. It is not surprising because
as we widen the scope and include more markets from the middle, the differences between
the groups of markets become less distinguished. If we carry out the same exercise after
excluding periods 1-5, then when comparing the upper and lower 4/5 markets, we see a
significant difference at 5% for total dispersion and amplitude.
If we calculate the correlation between the bubble/mispricing measures and the market-
level individual characteristics (see Table A3 in Appendix C), only few significant asso-
ciations emerge. The mean of risk tolerance has the expected positive sign for all bub-
ble/mispricing measures but exhibits only marginal positive significance with only one of
the bubble measures (positive amplitude).10 The lack of systemic correlations suggests
that generally there is no linear relationship between bubble/mispricing measures and
individual characteristics aggregated on the market level. In Appendix D we present the
results of some simple OLS regressions in which the dependent variables are the bub-
ble/mispricing measures, while the explanatory variables are the market-level individual
characteristics. These simple linear regressions reflect what we have seen with the correla-
tions. Hence, risk is only marginally significant when explaining positive amplitude. Both
the mean and the standard deviation of risk tolerance increases R2 sometimes markedly,
but none of these variables becomes significant.11 We summarize these observations in
Finding 1.
Finding 1: There is no linear relationship between risk tolerance and bubble/mispricing
measures. However, if we compare markets pertaining to the upper and lower quartiles
for all the periods, then we observe significant differences at the 5% significance level for
the bubble measures. If we exclude periods 1-5, then the differences are significant at 5%
for all bubble and mispricing measures.
The previous finding lends support to our Hypothesis 1.
10The mean of uncertainty is weakly correlated with average bias, while the mean of cognitive abilities
is negatively associated in a significant manner with two mispricing measures. The share of female
participants is negatively correlated with turnover.
11In the regression explaining positive amplitude, the mean of risk tolerance remains marginally signif-
icant.
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Figure 2: Excess buy orders as a function of risk, cognitive abilities, and gender
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3.2 Individual buy and sell orders
As conjectured earlier, we expect that the more risk-tolerant the trader, the more she
values a risky asset. This higher valuation may materialize in a higher buy order because
if a trader attaches a higher value to owning an asset, then she might be willing to pay a
higher price. By the same token, if a more risk-tolerant trader values an asset more, then
she may be willing to sell it only at higher prices. Higher buy and sell orders may induce
higher prices that may lead to a bubble. The previous reasoning implies that the process
is more likely to occur in markets formed by more risk tolerant traders. Therefore, risk
sorting may enhance bubbles.
Bubbles emerge if the market price exceeds the fundamental value, and the larger is
this excess, the more likely that eventually a bubble forms. Therefore, here we attempt to
explain the difference between the buy order and the fundamental value (excess buy order)
and the difference between the sell order and the fundamental value (excess sell order)
by using individual and market-level characteristics. We also account for the periods,
financial position, and experience that participants have. Figures 2 and 3 suggest that
risk aversion, cognitive abilities, and gender may have an impact on how much buy and
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Figure 3: Excess sell orders as a function of risk, cognitive abilities, and gender
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sell orders exceed the fundamental value. A point corresponds to a buy/sell order that
exceeds the fundamental value submitted in round 1 of the experiment in any period by
a trader of a given risk tolerance/cognitive ability/gender. The figures also suggest that
the effect seems to be stronger for buy orders.
According to the graph, more risk-tolerant/cognitively-less-able participants tend to
submit buy/sell orders that increasingly exceed the fundamental value. Our data suggest
that females are more likely to submit excessive buy/sell orders. To see if these and
other factors really matter, we carry out a regression analysis that controls for the when a
buy/sell order is placed among list of other variables (as before, we exclude markets 7 and
9 from this analysis). We also include the lag of market price and dividend (that is, the
market price and dividend in the last period) in the regression, as these represent the most
recent market experience of the participants. To account for the participants’ financial
position, we also consider their asset and cash holding. Since we are mainly interested in
the effect of time-invariant variables, we use a random-effects panel estimation. Standard
errors are clustered on the individual level.
On the individual level, risk and uncertainty are positively and significantly correlated,
hence, in the regressions we use only the risk aversion measure. Cognitive abilities corre-
late negatively in a significant way with being female. As both these measures have been
found important in the literature, we will use both of them in separate regressions. Hence,
our individual characteristics are risk tolerance (the variable used to form the groups),
cognitive abilities measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test, a dummy variable that is
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1 if a participant chooses the risky option in the stag hunt game (strategic uncertainty),
and a dummy for being female.
Table 4: Excess buy order: Random-effects panel regressions with individual characteris-
tics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Dependent variable: Excess buy order
Risk Tolerance 0.205*** 0.139**
(0.0612) (0.0547)
Cognitive Abilities −58.77*** −37.15***
(16.45) (10.92)
Female 137.3*** 101.2***
(46.09) (37.35)
Strategic Uncertainty −2.895 2.052
(55.10) (48.10)
Assets (lagged) −24.77** −19.71* −15.43 −15.38 −24.51**
(12.47) (11.35) (11.83) (12.52) (11.36)
Cash (lagged) −0.0265** −0.0268*** −0.0200** −0.0265** −0.0219**
(0.0115) (0.00934) (0.00897) (0.0122) (0.00923)
Market Price (lagged) 0.447*** 0.497*** 0.460*** 0.542*** 0.389***
(0.115) (0.104) (0.109) (0.108) (0.101)
Dividend (lagged) −0.126 −0.158 −0.0901 −0.0974 −0.149
(0.173) (0.175) (0.175) (0.172) (0.165)
Remaining Period −78.57*** −93.69*** −84.96*** −96.27*** −74.33***
(28.10) (29.10) (28.55) (27.52) (27.52)
Remaining Period Squared 2.930 3.715* 3.632* 3.807** 3.027
(1.893) (1.951) (1.933) (1.895) (1.869)
Constant 126.1 348.4*** 137.9 207.7 190.8*
(106.0) (122.2) (92.84) (139.4) (115.7)
Observations 211 211 211 211 211
Prob > χ2 7.49e− 07 2.73e−08 3.78e−06 9.42e−05 0
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
As can be seen in Table 4, when considering individual characteristics, risk tolerance,
cognitive abilities and gender significantly affect (at 1% significance level) how much buy
orders exceed the fundamental value, even if we take into account a host of variables that
reflect financial position and market experience. More risk-tolerant individuals tend to
submit more excessive buy orders. In line with the findings in Bosch-Rosa et al. (2018),
traders with better cognitive abilities submit less excessive buy orders, lowering the chance
that a bubble forms. Our data indicate that females were more likely to submit excessive
buy orders, contrary to what we would expect based on Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn (2015). Note
that Wang et al. (2017) show that the effect of gender may be sensitive to culture, as in
China all-female groups do not generate smaller bubbles than all-male groups. According
to the regressions, strategic uncertainty captured by the choice in the stag hunt game
does not seem to influence the excess buy order. When we plug all these individual
characteristics in the same regression, then the magnitudes change somewhat (due to
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the correlation between the variables), but the sign and the significance remain. The
fact that risk tolerance remains significant in the last column even after controlling for
cognitive abilities and gender indicates that risk tolerance has an additional effect and is
an important factor to understand how bubbles emerge. The coefficient of the variable
Remaining Period is consistently negative and significant. Note that fundamental value
decreases with the number of periods, so the same excess buy order (that is, buy order
minus fundamental value) is relatively smaller at the beginning of the round than at the
end, when the fundamental value goes to zero. Hence, the negative coefficient indicates
that even if the buy order exceeds the fundamental value, it does so in a diminishing
manner over time.
The financial position is relevant, as both the number of assets and cash holding at
the end of the previous period decrease the excess in the buy orders significantly, and
the effect of cash seems to be stronger. This suggests that those who had many assets
and/or cash were not desperate to buy new assets and did not tend to submit excessive
buy orders. Market price in the previous period had a positive and significant effect on
excess buy orders: The higher the market price is, the larger the excess in the buy order.
The amount of dividend in the previous period has no such effect.
Table A11 in Appendix E shows the results of the same regression when the dependent
variable is excess sell order. There none of the individual characteristics proves to be
significant, while the rest of the variables behaves as in Table 4. This suggests that buy
orders contribute more to the formation of bubbles. If instead of excess buy/sell orders
we only use buy/sell orders, then we fail to find any significant effect of the individual
characteristics, while the rest of the variables has qualitatively the same effect.
As a robustness check, we carry out the same analysis but with the dependent variable
being relative excess buy/sell order. Relative excess buy/sell order is excess buy/sell order
divided by the fundamental value in a given period. Table A13 in Appendix F contains
the results for relative excess buy orders. When introducing the individual characteristics
separately, we see the same effects as in Table 4. However, when introducing all individual
characteristics jointly, the effect of risk tolerance remains positive, but it is not signifi-
cant any more. The effect of cognitive ability and gender has the same sign as before,
moreover, they are significant both when considered separately and jointly. The effect
of financial position ceases to be significant, but the lagged market price has the same
significant effect as before. Dividend has no significant effect as in Table 4. Table A14
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in Appendix F shows the findings for relative excess sell orders. When considering the
individual characteristics separately, only risk tolerance has a significant effect (at 10%)
with the expected sign. However, when considering the individual characteristics jointly,
the significance disappears. In these regressions financial position has some importance,
as the effect of the assets is significant and has the same sign as in Table A11. We ob-
serve that cash and dividend have no effect, while lagged market price has a positive and
significant effect.
As a further check, we consider market-level characteristics instead of individual char-
acteristics. Remember that the idea of the paper is that if we sort individuals according
to risk tolerance into markets, then it may affect the emergence of bubbles. Hence, we
may expect to see larger excess buy/sell orders on markets with a higher average risk
tolerance.12 Table 5 contains the same regressions as Table 4 but with the average and
standard deviation of market-level characteristics (whenever possible). Reassuringly, the
averages of risk, cognitive abilities, and gender are again significant and have the same
sign. Hence, the more risk-tolerant a market is on average, the higher the individual
excess buy orders. Similarly, markets with a higher average cognitive ability have less
excess buy orders, and in markets with a higher share of females, we see higher excess
buy orders. Strategic uncertainty proves insignificant in these regressions as well. The
standard deviation of risk tolerance does not seem to affect excess buy orders. However,
a higher variability in cognitive abilities leads to higher excess buy orders. This is in
line with Hanaki et al. (2017). When pooling all the market-level variables, some of the
significance vanishes, but risk and gender remain significant. The variables reflecting fi-
nancial position and market experience are similar in value, sign, and significance to those
in Table 4.
The corresponding regressions for excess sell orders can be found in Table A12 in Ap-
pendix E. Neither the average nor the standard deviation of risk tolerance on the market
level affects excess sell orders. The standard deviation of cognitive abilities (but not the
average) has a significant positive effect, while being female–as in previous regressions–
increases excess sell order, ceteris paribus. Strategic uncertainty on the market level is not
significant. When pooling the characteristics, only cognitive abilities have a significant
effect, decreasing excess sell orders. In these regressions the effect of the financial position
12We do not have individual and market-level characteristics in the same regressions because they
correlate significantly in case of risk, cognitive abilities, and gender.
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Table 5: Excess buy orders: Random-effects panel regressions with market-level charac-
teristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Dependent variable: Excess buy order
Risk Tol. Average 0.220*** 0.136**
(0.0641) (0.0562)
Risk Tol. St.Dev. −0.336 1.619
(0.668) (1.295)
Cognitive Average −82.99** −73.25
(41.72) (57.47)
Cognitive St.Dev. 212.0*** 51.00
(72.24) (84.19)
Share of Females 37.64*** 41.94**
(12.17) (19.82)
Str.Uncertainty Average 167.8 −264.4
(129.7) (181.5)
Assets (lagged) −23.99* −23.88* −18.30 −17.79 −30.14**
(12.41) (12.78) (12.89) (12.38) (12.22)
Cash (lagged) −0.0263** −0.0269** −0.0268** −0.0267** −0.0295**
(0.0116) (0.0121) (0.0118) (0.0112) (0.0130)
Market Price (lagged) 0.428*** 0.413*** 0.365*** 0.529*** 0.248**
(0.109) (0.110) (0.107) (0.115) (0.112)
Dividend (lagged) −0.118 −0.248 −0.108 −0.123 −0.202
(0.176) (0.185) (0.173) (0.183) (0.186)
Remaining Period −74.88*** −59.72** −64.98** −85.85*** −47.74*
(27.86) (28.06) (27.19) (29.21) (27.75)
Remaining Period Squared 2.735 1.581 2.521 3.004 1.726
(1.870) (1.946) (1.806) (2.049) (1.850)
Constant 131.9 138.9 153.2 107.2 303.0
(106.1) (160.9) (114.2) (113.4) (261.2)
Observations 211 211 211 211 211
Prob > χ2 5.17e− 07 3.21e−06 5.76e−05 3.27e−05 0
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
and market experience is somewhat weaker, but when significant, they have the same sign
as before.
Finding 2: We find convincing evidence that risk tolerance plays an important role
in explaining how much individual buy orders exceed the fundamental value, while the
evidence is weaker when sell orders are considered. In line with the existing literature,
we find that cognitive abilities and gender are important factors in understanding excess
buy orders. Interestingly, the effects of risk tolerance, cognitive abilities, and gender are
weaker or non-existent when investigating excess sell orders. Financial position is often
important: More assets and/or more cash lead to less excess buy/sell orders. Higher
market prices in the last period consistently increase both excess buy and sell orders,
while dividend does not have an influence on excess buy/sell orders.
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3.3 Round 2
A general finding in the literature (see Palan, 2013 or Powell and Shestakova, 2016) is that
experience decreases bubbles/mispricing. Therefore, in later rounds generally smaller or
no bubbles are observed. Reassuringly, we observe such tendencies when studying the
price evolution in round 2 (see Appendix G). More precisely, in markets 1-3 we do not see
a decrease in bubbles/mispricing, however, in markets 4-6 and markets 10-12, mispricing
vanishes and per-period prices track the fundamental value very closely. Markets 7 and
9 behave as strangely as they do in round 1, while in the case of market 8 mispricing
disappears.
To check if there are still significant differences between markets 1-3 with the most
risk-tolerant traders and markets 10-12 with the most risk averse ones, we carry out the
Mann-Whitney test (see Appendix H). When considering all periods, in two of the three
bubble measures (Positive Deviation and Positive Amplitude), we still observe significant
differences and one of the mispricing measures (Total Dispersion) also exhibits significant
differences. When excluding periods 1-5, there are significant differences at 5% significance
level in all bubble/mispricing measures except boom duration and turnover, just as in
round 1.
When we apply the Mann-Whitney test to compare round 1 and round 2 bubble
measures across the market quartiles (see Table A16 Appendix I), we observe that in
markets 1-3 bubble/mispricing measure did not diminish. Participants in these markets
in round 2 generated similar bubbles as in round 1. However, in markets 4-6 in all
mispricing measures and in turnover we see a significant decrease at the 5 % significance
levels but no significant decrease is observed in the bubble measures. In markets 7-9 there
is no noticeable decrease in the bubble measures across rounds, while in markets 10-12
we observe significant decline in two mispricing measures. In these last two cases the lack
of significant decrease is not surprising, as in round 1 there were already no pronounced
bubbles/mispricings.
Finding 3: Significant differences remain between the three markets with the most and
least risk-tolerant traders when considering several bubble/mispricing measures. More-
over, bubbles and mispricing remains in the markets with the most risk-tolerant traders,
while they diminish or disappear in other markets that exhibit the crash pattern.
Finding 3 suggests that there is some persistence of bubbles and mispricing when
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considering the markets populated by the most risk-tolerant traders.
4 Conclusion
Recent studies indicate that sorting in markets along some individual characteristics may
be behind the emergence of bubbles in experimental asset markets. We claim that there
is some sorting according to risk tolerance going on in real life and investigate in the lab
whether such sorting may explain the formation of bubbles.
We find evidence that markets with the most risk-tolerant traders exhibit larger bub-
bles/mispricing than those with the least risk-tolerant ones. However, the effect is not
linear, as we were able to document significant differences only on the extremes. We also
find some convincing evidence that more risk-tolerant traders are more likely to submit
buy orders that exceed the fundamental value of the asset. Since more risk-tolerant traders
participated in the same markets, these excess buy orders may be a prime drive behind
market prices over the fundamental value. Interestingly, we do not see this mechanism at
work to this extent when studying sell orders. We also document that bubbles/mispricing
is persistent in the markets populated by the most risk-tolerant traders.
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A Appendix A: Instructions
Dear Participant,
Thank you for participating in this experiment! Participation is VOLUNTARY and
ANONYMOUS, that is, none of the participants will ever get any information about your
decisions or earnings. We treat all information that we gather during the experiment
confidentially.
Please, follow the instructions carefully. Always keep the identifier that you received
at the entrance with you, as you need it during the experiment and to get your earnings
at the end. Should you have questions, raise your hand and we will attend to you. During
the experiment it is forbidden to speak or communicate in any other way with the rest
of the participants. If you do not comply with that rule, then you will be excluded from
the experiment. Please, switch off your mobile phone.
The course of the experiment
1.a Tasks
1.b Trial period
1.c Questionnaire
— Reassignment to other computer—
2 Trading game
3 Payment of earnings
You receive 1000 HUFs for participating in this experiment, and for your performance
in 1.a and 2 you are entitled to additional earnings. During the experiment the exper-
imental currency is called petak ; We register all your transactions in this currency. We
pay all the petaks that you earn at the end of the experiment in cash at the following
exchange rate: 3 petaks = 1 HUF.
Part 1
In part 1.a you see four tasks and the answers you give in those tasks may earn you
money. Note that the questions you see in these tasks often have no objectively correct
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answer. At the end of the experiment we choose one of the tasks randomly to calculate
your earnings and your earnings in part 1 is determined by the answer that you have
given in that task.
In part 1.b we go through how the trading game works and then, you play a trial
period. The trial period is followed by a short questionnaire (1.c). Then, we regroup you
and you may have to change rooms.
Part 2
In part 2 you play the trading game in groups of 8. In the trading game you may sell and
buy securities. If you make good decisions, then you may earn a substantial amount of
money. This part of the experiment consists of two rounds that are independent, and in
each round there will be 15 periods. You will receive more information about the trading
game before the trial period.
Market and Trading
You trade on a market with 7 other participants. Throughout the experiment the markets
do not change, that is, you trade with the same participants.
The experiment consists of 2 independent rounds, and in each round you can trade
for 15 periods. At the beginning of each round the participants are endowed with certain
amount of ECU (experimental currency) and some assets. The amount of ECUs and the
number of assets may vary among participants, but the expected value of the bundle of
ECUs and assets someone receives is the same for all participants.
Assets expire after 15 periods, that is, at the end of the round they are worthless. If
you buy an asset, then you will own the asset starting from the period you buy it until
you sell it. After each period (including the last one, i.e. 15th period) each asset yields
0, 40, 140, or 300 ECUs. The probability of each dividend is 25%. This means that the
average dividend in each period is 120 ECUs. The dividend is added to your account
automatically after each period. After the dividends are distributed at the end of 15th
period, the market closes and the assets cease to exist.
We attach a table named “Average value of holding an asset,” which can help you in
deciding whether to buy or sell. The table shows, how much dividend you can expect
on average if you keep the asset till the end of the round. We calculated this value by
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taking the remaining number of periods and multiplying it 120, the average dividend in
each period.
If you want to buy an asset, then you can place a buy order to do so. A buy order
consists of the number of assets you want to buy and the highest price you are willing to
pay for each asset. It is important to note that you will buy each asset for the same price.
If you want to sell an asset, then you can place a sell order to do so. Similarly to the
buy order, a sell order consists of the amount of asset you want to sell and the lowest
price for which you are willing to sell each asset. As in the previous case, each asset will
be sold for the same price.
It is important to note that you can place only one sell order in each period, that is,
you can only sell your assets for one price. You can sell more than one asset for this price
(but only as many as you own). Similarly, you can place only one buy order, but for this
price you can buy more than one asset (provided you have enough ECUs). You can place
both a buy and a sell order in one period, but in this case the buying price must be lower
than the selling price. In all cases prices refer to per-asset prices. You are not obliged to
trade. If you think that neither selling nor buying an asset is worth it, then you do not
need to initiate any transaction.
Figure 4: Trading screen
In each period you have 90 seconds to place buy and sell orders, which you can do on
the bottom right corner on the trading screen with a yellow background (see Figure 4.).
If you click on the ’Place buy order’ button (B2), then your order in the purple container
(A1) will be transferred into the order book on the left (C3).13 Your order is then marked
13Translations: ’Vteli megbzs’ = ’Buy order’, ’Eladsi megbzs’ = ’Sell order’, ’Mennyisg’ = ’Amount’,
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as sent, but you can cancel it until the end of the period. The sell order works in a similar
fashion. If you have already decided on what orders to place and you transferred these to
the order book, then you have two possibilities: either you wait for the remaining time to
run out or you click to the ’Send order’ button (D4), after which you cannot trade any
more in that given period.
Determining the trading price
The trading software compiles the buy and sell orders and determines the trading price
on which the assets are exchanged. Under the calculated price the maximum amount of
asset exchange will take place. It is possible that there is more than one such price. In
the following example we demonstrate how the trading price gets chosen.
It is important to note that if your buy order is lower than the calculated trading
price, then you will not buy any assets. Sometimes it can happen that even though your
buy order is higher than the trading price, you still do not manage to buy any assets.
This happens because there is overdemand, and it is impossible to satisfy all claims; In
such cases transactions happen in the order that the buy orders were placed. Similarly, if
you have given a higher sell order than the trading price, then you will not sell any assets.
In case of oversupply it can happen that you have given a sell order that is lower than the
trading price, but you still do not sell any assets because the others placed orders before
you.
Figure 5: Example (The labels are translated from Hungarian.)
’r/db’ = ’Price per quantity’, ’Piac’ = ’Market’, ’Kszpnz’ = ’Cash’, ’rtkpapr’ = ’Asset’, ’Visszavons’ =
’Cancel’, ’Megbzs elkldse’ = ’Send order’
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Example
As we can see in Figure 5, below 400 ECUs both Player 3 and 4 would buy, but neither
Player 1 nor Player 2 is willing to sell. In this case the demand is greater than the supply:
There is excess demand. Prices below 400 ECUs do not lead to transactions. For prices
between 400 and 450 ECUs, both Player 3 and 4 is still willing to buy and Player 2 is
willing to sell his/her asset. As there are more buyers than sellers, there is still excess
demand. Similarly, above 550 ECUs both Player 1 and 2 are willing to sell their assets
but only Player 3 is willing to buy. Two sellers face only one buyer, thus, there is excess
supply. Above 650 ECUs the events turn into worse as there are no buyers although there
are two sellers.
Between 450 and 550 ECUs Player 2 is willing to sell his/her asset and Player 3 is
willing to buy for this price. This price is too high for Player 4 (who would like to buy)
and too low for Player 1 (who would like to sell). That is, for such prices there is only one
buyer and one seller, so there is no excess demand or supply. In such a case the trading
price is the average of 450 and 550 ECUs, that is, 500 ECUs.
If oversupply drives the market, then buyers are in better position, thus, the smallest
trading price will be realized. If dominantly there is overdemand on the market, then
sellers are in better position, hence, the highest possible price will prevail. If there is both
oversupply and overdemand, then the trading price is set as the average of the highest
and lowest possible price.
To understand the decision mechanism better there will be a trial period, where you
can place buy and sell orders, before entering the real market. For these decisions you
will not receive any payment. In the trial period you will receive a different amount of
ECUs and assets than in the real rounds, and in addition, after the end of the trial period
you will not see the trading price, instead you will see what transactions took place under
the different buy and sell orders.
The trial period is followed by a short query, after which you will be assigned to a
computer in one of the labs for part 2 of the experiment. Please do not wander off too
far during the break when you are reassigned.
Payments
Your final payment consists of three parts:
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• 1000 HUF for participating in the experiment
• the money you earn in one of the 4 questions (chosen randomly) in part 1 of the
experiment
• your balance after the 15th period in one of the rounds (chosen randomly) in part
2 of the experiment
As we mentioned earlier, we keep your balance in ECUs and pay you with the exchange
rate 3 ECU = 1 HUF at the end of the experiment.
If you have any further question, please indicate now!
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B Appendix B: Risk tolerance and bubble/mispricing
measures - first 5 periods excluded
Table A1: Observed values of bubble and mispricing measures when excluding first 5
periods. The last row contains the p-value of the Mann-Whitney U test comparing markets
1-3 to 10-12.
Bubble measures Mispricing measures
Positive Boom Positive Average Total
Market Deviation Duration Amplitude Bias Dispersion Amplitude Turnover
1 1795 8 490 199.44 1795 475 0.81
2 2340 8 690 230 2380 730 1.25
3 4180 7 800 522.5 4180 600 0.88
Average 1-3 2771.67 7.67 660.00 317.31 2785.00 601.67 0.98
4 110.5 2 80 −46.58 500.5 280 0.69
5 2670 9 520 267 2670 520 1.13
6 930 5 160 116.25 930 90 1.13
Average 4-6 1236.83 5.33 253.33 112.22 1366.83 296.67 0.98
7 7180 5 1430 897.50 7180 1430 0.94
8 430 8 100 47.78 430 80 1.56
9 6140 3 1540 1023.33 6140 1120 0.63
Average 7-9 4583.33 5.33 1023.33 656.20 4583.33 876.67 1.04
10 1272 5 420 159 1272 420 1.19
11 420 3 120 47.5 460 160 1
12 330 4 96 25.71 480 246 1
Average 10-12 674 4 212 77.40 737.33 275.33 1.06
p-value 0.0495 0.0463 0.0495 0.0495 0.0495 0.0495 0.5066
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C Appendix C: Market-level correlation between bub-
ble/mispricing measures and individual character-
istics
Table A2: Pairwise correlation between market-level bubble measures and market level
individual characteristics (all markets).
Bubble measures Mispricing measures
Positive Boom Positive Average Total
Deviation Duration Amplitude Bias Dispersion Amplitude Turnover
Risk (mean) 0.0852 0.4717 0.1020 0.1267 0.0512 −0.0851 0.0170
Risk (Std.dev.) −0.3517 0.1354 −0.3031 −0.0986 −0.4647 −0.4015 −0.0475
Uncertainty (mean) 0.2183 0.5014* 0.1819 0.2716 0.1482 −0.0507 −0.0155
Uncertainty (Std.dev.) −0.2650 0.4568 −0.1997 −0.1547 −0.3045 −0.2797 0.0961
Share of risky choice −0.0526 0.3077 −0.0870 0.0883 −0.1349 −0.1081 0.2440
in stag hunt
Cognitive (mean) −0.4544 −0.0101 −0.4533 −0.2594 −0.5623* −0.5904** −0.0994
Cognitive (Std.dev.) −0.3176 0.2481 −0.4218 −0.3552 −0.2889 −0.2730 −0.3253
Share of female 0.4955 −0.3069 0.5056* 0.3220 0.5582* 0.5798** −0.7977***
Table A3: Pairwise correlation between market-level bubble measures and market level
individual characteristics (ignoring markets 7 and 9).
Bubble measures Mispricing measures
Positive Boom Positive Average Total
Deviation Duration Amplitude Bias Dispersion Amplitude Turnover
Risk (mean) 0.4861 0.4396 0.5663* 0.5185 0.3332 0.0795 −0.0672
Risk (Std.dev.) −0.1371 0.0713 −0.0766 0.3294 −0.3616 −0.2965 −0.0680
Uncertainty (mean) 0.5357 0.4913 0.5344 0.6051* 0.3312 0.0253 −0.1276
Uncertainty (Std.dev.) 0.2131 0.3881 0.3764 0.3892 0.0570 0.0274 0.0036
Share of risky choice 0.2768 0.2333 0.2696 0.5287 0.0721 0.1126 0.1398
in stag hunt
Cognitive (mean) −0.5464 −0.1332 −0.4979 −0.1097 −0.6638** −0.6018* −0.2997
Cognitive (Std.dev.) 0.0815 0.1051 −0.0897 −0.0020 0.0827 0.0833 −0.6578**
Share of female 0.4691 −0.1702 0.3895 0.0363 0.5379 0.4671 −0.7486**
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D Appendix D: Linear regressions: Bubble/mispricing
measures explained by market-level characteris-
tics
We exclude markets 7 and 9 from the analysis in this section.
Table A4: Positive deviation and market-level characteristics (OLS).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Dependent variable: Positive Deviation
Risk mean 0.523 1.427
(1.935) (1.983)
Uncert. mean 2.391 5.068
(3.380) (3.682)
Cognitive mean -1.938 -1.799
(1.201) (1.218)
Female share 4.703
(2.607)
Risky share in staghunt -736.8
(4.428)
Risk Std.dev. -34.25
(25.66)
Uncert. Std.dev. -8.033
(5.467)
Cognitive Std.dev. -2.136
(2.293)
Constant 2,030 1,144 5,571** 38.74 2,725 2,572* 1,766 7,937**
(1.351) (1.829) (2.099) (1.417) (2.413) (1.363) (1.782) (3.304)
Observations 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
R2 0.007 0.048 0.207 0.246 0.003 0.171 0.232 0.276
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A5: Boom duration and market-level characteristics (OLS).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Dependent variable: Boom Duration
Risk mean 0.003 0.00317
(0.00217) (0.00244)
Uncertainty mean 0.00596 0.00482
(0.00374) (0.00463)
Cognitive mean -0.651 -0.642
(1.714) (1.822)
Female share -2.025
(4.143)
Risky share staghunt 3.713
(5.470)
Risk sd -0.00718
(0.0331)
Uncertainty sd 0.00349
(0.00743)
Cognitive sd 1.009
(3.666)
Constant 4.326** 3.175 7.324** 7.111*** 4.204 4.475** 2.813 6.026
(1.598) (2.067) (3.101) (2.085) (3.081) (1.836) (2.308) (5.754)
Observations 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
R2 0.193 0.241 0.018 0.029 0.054 0.199 0.265 0.028
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A6: Positive amplitude and market-level characteristics (OLS).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Dependent variable: Positive Amplitude
Risk mean 0.367* 0.427*
(0.189) (0.201)
Uncertainty mean 0.616 0.537
(0.345) (0.430)
Cognitive mean -231.3 -232.2
(142.5) (151.3)
Female share 440.1
(367.9)
Risky share staghunt 407.6
(514.7)
Risk sd -2.531
(2.732)
Uncertainty sd 0.243
(0.690)
Cognitive sd -92.99
(304.4)
Constant 121.3 37.98 749.7** 152.6 131.5 173.8 12.78 869.3
(139.3) (190.6) (257.8) (185.1) (289.9) (151.6) (214.3) (477.8)
Observations 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
R2 0.321 0.286 0.248 0.152 0.073 0.395 0.298 0.258
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A7: Average bias and market-level characteristics (OLS).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Dependent variable: Average Bias
Risk mean 0.123 0.109
(0.0715) (0.0791)
Uncertainty mean 0.255* 0.233
(0.119) (0.148)
Cognitive mean -18.62 -18.63
(59.63) (63.76)
Female share 14.97
(145.8)
Risky share staghunt 291.9
(165.7)
Risk sd 0.585
(1.074)
Uncertainty sd 0.066
(0.238)
Cognitive sd -1.43
(128.3)
Constant -106.7* -159.3** 2.078 -36.78 -186.9* -118.9* -166.1* 3.917
(52.79) (65.57) (107.9) (73.35) (93.31) (59.60) (73.95) (201.3)
Observations 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
R2 0.269 0.366 0.012 0.001 0.279 0.299 0.373 0.012
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A8: Total dispersion and market-level characteristics (OLS).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Dependent variable: Total Dispersion
Risk mean 1.663 2.497
(1.663) (1.598)
Uncertainty mean 2.942 3.703
(2.963) (3.686)
Cognitive mean -2,375** -2,370*
(946.3) (1.007)
Female share 4.681
(2.594)
Risky share staghunt 839.3
(4.106)
Risk sd -35.38
(21.71)
Uncertainty sd -2.318
(5.919)
Cognitive sd 502.6
(2.027)
Constant 2,220 1,767 7,357*** 1,153 2,808 2,955** 2,007 6,710*
(1,227) (1,639) (1.712) (1,305) (2,312) (1,205) (1,838) (3,181)
Observations 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
R2 0.111 0.110 0.441 0.289 0.005 0.356 0.129 0.445
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A9: Amplitude and market-level characteristics (OLS).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Dependent variable: Amplitude
Risk mean 0.107 0.262
(0.474) (0.503)
Uncertainty mean 0.0606 0.0361
(0.847) (1.065)
Cognitive mean -580.9* -579.6*
(272.6) (290.3)
Female share 1,096
(733.9)
Risky share staghunt 353.5
(1.103)
Risk sd -6.562
(6.837)
Uncertainty sd 0.0749
(1.710)
Cognitive sd 139.1
(584.0)
Constant 1,061** 1,097** 2,130*** 634.3 937.7 1,197** 1,089* 1,951*
(350.1) (468.4) (493.3) (369.2) (621.4) (379.4) (531.1) (916.5)
Observations 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
R2 0.006 0.001 0.362 0.218 0.013 0.122 0.001 0.367
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A10: Turnover and market-level characteristics (OLS).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables Dependent variable: Turnover
Risk mean -4.78e-05 -3.60e-05
(0.000251) (0.000283)
Uncertainty mean -0.000162 -0.000227
(0.000444) (0.000557)
Cognitive mean -0.153 -0.160
(0.172) (0.132)
Female share -0.929**
(0.291)
Risky share staghunt 0.232
(0.581)
Risk sd -0.000501
(0.00384)
Uncertainty sd 0.000199
(0.000894)
Cognitive sd -0.682**
(0.266)
Constant 1.667*** 1.719*** 1.901*** 2.056*** 1.513*** 1.678*** 1.699*** 2.778***
(0.185) (0.246) (0.312) (0.146) (0.327) (0.213) (0.278) (0.417)
Observations 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
R2 0.005 0.016 0.090 0.560 0.020 0.007 0.023 0.530
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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E Appendix E: Excess buy and excess sell orders
Table A11: Excess sell orders: Random-effects panel regressions with individual charac-
teristics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Dependent variable: Excess sell order
Risk Tolerance −0.0379 −0.0814
(0.210) (0.218)
Cognitive Abilities −43.37 −38.41
(45.76) (35.63)
Female 118.5 104.8
(120.9) (103.3)
Strategic Uncertainty 116.8 132.3
(116.7) (129.5)
Assets (lagged) −55.22** −51.47** −50.30* −56.32** −51.21*
(25.61) (25.71) (26.27) (25.27) (29.12)
Cash (lagged) 0.0186 0.0222 0.0227 0.0191 0.0231
(0.0270) (0.0278) (0.0276) (0.0278) (0.0289)
Market Price (lagged) 0.349** 0.330* 0.331* 0.337* 0.330*
(0.167) (0.172) (0.171) (0.174) (0.169)
Dividend (lagged) 0.0141 −0.00145 0.00433 0.00429 −0.00291
(0.268) (0.262) (0.262) (0.259) (0.265)
Remaining Period −4.100 2.657 1.761 −0.649 3.961
(44.32) (47.43) (47.60) (50.51) (43.49)
Remaining Period Squared 0.268 −0.00382 0.0666 0.0733 −0.0623
(3.291) (3.402) (3.453) (3.599) (3.242)
Constant 203.2 224.1 92.27 115.7 136.9
(278.0) (224.1) (262.4) (252.8) (289.6)
Observations 436 436 436 436 436
Prob > χ2 0.000906 0.000389 0.000804 0.00597 5.26e−05
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A12: Excess sell order: Random-effects panel regressions with market-level charac-
teristics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Dependent variable: Excess sell order
Risk Tol. Average −0.0522 −0.217
(0.234) (0.255)
Risk Tol. St.Dev. 1.825 4.839
(2.137) (3.817)
Cognitive Average −97.02 −218.9**
(87.18) (88.80)
Cognitive St.Dev. 398.1** 197.9
(177.9) (162.8)
Share of Females 44.03** 55.02
(20.84) (33.97)
Str.Uncertainty Average 111.7 −466.8
(386.2) (530.2)
Assets (lagged) −56.93** −58.44** −55.72** −54.96** −63.07**
(26.94) (25.14) (24.76) (24.30) (28.09)
Cash (lagged) 0.0177 0.0170 0.0185 0.0190 0.0126
(0.0280) (0.0273) (0.0267) (0.0276) (0.0274)
Market Price (lagged) 0.351** 0.319* 0.315* 0.337** 0.322*
(0.166) (0.172) (0.177) (0.172) (0.168)
Dividend (lagged) 0.0115 −0.0138 0.0150 0.00747 −0.0152
(0.268) (0.263) (0.264) (0.262) (0.264)
Remaining Period −4.723 2.318 3.377 −1.166 1.020
(43.51) (48.24) (50.27) (48.38) (44.40)
Remaining Period Squared 0.262 −0.101 −0.120 0.120 −0.125
(3.266) (3.449) (3.594) (3.439) (3.338)
Constant 155.2 −131.2 34.41 118.2 386.7
(261.3) (281.9) (206.2) (318.1) (392.8)
Observations 436 436 436 436 436
Prob > χ2 0.000213 1.38e−07 2.03e−05 0.00194 2.78e−10
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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F Appendix F: Relative excess buy and sell orders
Here we report the results of the panel regressions that follow the same structure as those
in the main text but with the dependent variable being relative excess buy (sell) order
defined as excess buy (sell) order divided by the fundamental value in the given period.
When running the regressions represented in Tables A13 and A14, we eliminate irrational
buy/sell orders that exceed the fundamental value by more than 100 %.
Table A13: Relative excess buy order: Random-effects panel regressions with individual
characteristics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Dependent variable: Relative excess buy order
RiskTolerance 0.000136** 8.01e− 05
(5.53e− 05) (4.89e− 05)
CognitiveAbilities −0.0461*** −0.0345**
(0.0162) (0.0152)
Female 0.0794** 0.0627*
(0.0351) (0.0350)
StrategicUncertainty 0.0559 0.0569*
(0.0358) (0.0333)
Assets lagged −0.00883 −0.00551 −0.00529 −0.00706 −0.00719
(0.0102) (0.00973) (0.0114) (0.0106) (0.00864)
Cash lagged −2.22e− 06 −2.21e− 06 4.59e− 07 −2.07e− 07 7.68e− 07
(9.90e− 06) (9.67e− 06) (9.98e− 06) (9.72e− 06) (8.36e− 06)
MarketPrice lagged 0.000212** 0.000247*** 0.000237*** 0.000279*** 0.000209**
(8.92e− 05) (8.91e− 05) (8.99e− 05) (8.82e− 05) (8.60e− 05)
Dividend lagged −1.50e− 05 −3.31e− 05 2.30e− 07 −9.85e− 06 −4.47e− 05
(0.000127) (0.000128) (0.000128) (0.000130) (0.000130)
RemainingPeriod −0.0528** −0.0635** −0.0621** −0.0654** −0.0561*
(0.0269) (0.0280) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0300)
RemainingPeriodSquared 0.00126 0.00193 0.00196 0.00188 0.00159
(0.00182) (0.00181) (0.00175) (0.00176) (0.00200)
Constant 0.194* 0.344*** 0.221** 0.210** 0.215**
(0.103) (0.0892) (0.0913) (0.0967) (0.0984)
Observations 190 190 190 190 190
Prob > χ2 0.000201 1.10e− 07 5.21e− 05 5.13e− 05 1.68e− 08
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A14: Relative excess sell order: Random-effects panel regressions with individual
characteristics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Dependent variable: Relative excess sell order
RiskTolerance 8.53e− 05* 7.40e− 05
(4.69e− 05) (5.16e− 05)
CognitiveAbilities −0.0134 −0.00863
(0.0177) (0.0185)
Female 0.0363 0.0346
(0.0463) (0.0481)
StrategicUncertainty 0.0523 0.0489
(0.0465) (0.0464)
Assets lagged −0.0342*** −0.0347*** −0.0348*** −0.0366*** −0.0333***
(0.0105) (0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0110)
Cash lagged 8.49e− 06 7.46e− 06 7.45e− 06 6.35e− 06 9.61e− 06
(1.03e− 05) (1.07e− 05) (1.03e− 05) (1.06e− 05) (1.05e− 05)
MarketPrice lagged 0.000326*** 0.000339*** 0.000340*** 0.000339*** 0.000320***
(6.02e− 05) (6.03e− 05) (5.95e− 05) (6.01e− 05) (6.05e− 05)
Dividend lagged 1.82e− 05 2.02e− 05 2.37e− 05 2.30e− 05 1.26e− 05
(0.000104) (0.000105) (0.000103) (0.000103) (0.000105)
RemainingPeriod −0.0830*** −0.0858*** −0.0865*** −0.0860*** −0.0808***
(0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0160) (0.0165) (0.0165)
RemainingPeriodSquared 0.00317*** 0.00330*** 0.00334*** 0.00328*** 0.00308***
(0.000943) (0.000936) (0.000938) (0.000959) (0.000953)
Constant 0.380*** 0.460*** 0.423*** 0.418*** 0.351***
(0.101) (0.0890) (0.0937) (0.0990) (0.111)
Observations 324 324 324 324 324
Prob > χ2 0 0 0 0 0
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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G Appendix G: Price evolution in round 2
Figure 6: Price evolution in round 2. (Top left pane: markets 1-3 populated by the
most risk-tolerant traders. Top right pane: markets 4-6, second most risk-tolerant set
of markets. Bottom left pane: markets 7-9, third most risk-tolerant quartile of markets.
Bottom right pane: markets 10-12 populated by the least risk-tolerant traders.)
47
H Appendix H: Bubble/mispricing measures in round
2
Table A15: Observed values of bubble and mispricing measures in round 2. The last row
contains the p-value of the Mann-Whitney U test comparing markets 1-3 to 10-12.
Bubble measures Mispricing measures
Positive Boom Positive Average Total
Deviation Duration Amplitude Bias Dispersion Amplitude Turnover
1 925 4 200 80.56 1125 400 0.81
2 1359 9 270 6.58 2639 1070 1.69
3 5035 9 875 430.45 5335 1175 1.06
Average 1-3 2439.67 7.33 448.33 172.53 3033 881.67 1.19
4 33 3 30 3.07 44 40 0.75
5 340 3 200 −1.45 696 270 1.19
6 1105 4 265 106.11 1255 395 1.13
Average 4-6 492.5 3.33 165 35.91 664.83 235 1.02
7 4245 4 1260 389.38 5375 1960 1.06
8 645 10 120 35.18 797.5 267.5 2.5
9 3850 3 1030 231 5390 1830 0.94
Average 7-9 2913.33 5.67 803.33 218.52 3854.17 1352.5 1.5
10 115 3 30 3.21 185 70 1.94
11 130 1 60 −18 440 180 1.19
12 580 5 130 12.08 1015 430 1.5
Average 10-12 275 3 73.33 −0.90 546.67 226.67 1.54
p-value 0.0495 0.1212 0.0495 0.1266 0.0495 0.1266 0.2752
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I Appendix I: Comparing bubble/mispricing measures
across rounds
Table A16: Comparing mispricing measures across rounds.
Average 1-3 Average 4-6
Round 1 Round 2 p-values Round 1 Round 2 p-values
Positive Deviation 2771.67 2439.67 0.5127 1273.50 492.5 0.5127
Boom Duration 7.67 7.33 0.5002 5.67 3.33 0.5066
Positive Amplitude 660.00 448.33 0.5127 253.33 165 0.8273
Average Bias 37.05 172.53 0.5127 −54.96 35.91 0.0495
Total Dispersion 5101.67 3033 0.2752 3116.83 664.83 0.0495
Amplitude 1493.33 881.67 0.2752 1033.33 235 0.0495
Turnover 1.65 1.19 0.2752 1.58 1.02 0.0495
Average 7-9 Average 10-12
Round 1 Round 2 p-values Round 1 Round 2 p-values
Positive Deviation 4646.67 2913.33 0.5127 674 275 0.2752
Boom Duration 6 5.67 0.8222 4 3 0.5002
Positive Amplitude 1033.33 803.33 0.2752 212 73.33 0.2752
Average Bias 220.97 218.52 0.8273 −93.01 −0.90 0.5127
Total Dispersion 6726.67 3854.17 0.2752 2373.33 546.67 0.0495
Amplitude 1760.00 1352.5 0.2752 1122.33 226.67 0.0495
Turnover 1.63 1.5 0.5127 1.56 1.54 1.0000
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